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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF JEWISH LAW 
Keith Sharfman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Like any legal system, Jewish law is amenable to economic 
analysis, both positive and normative.1  Economic analysis can help to 
explain how and why the various rules comprising Jewish law arose 
and persisted over time.  It also can facilitate a direct assessment of 
Jewish law on the merits.  In practice, however, it is a mainly positive 
economic analysis of Jewish law that scholars have emphasized, while 
normative analysis has, for the most part, been underemphasized. 
Take, for example, the application of law and economics to 
biblical exegesis.  The legal-economic work in this field has been 
largely descriptive rather than prescriptive.2  Scholars such as Saul 
 
*Professor of Law & Director of Bankruptcy Studies, St. John’s University School of Law.  I 
have received helpful input on earlier versions of this paper from participants at a meeting of 
the Association of American Law Schools, at conferences at Hebrew University and Touro 
Law School, and at a St. John’s University law faculty workshop.  Many thanks in particular 
to the late Kenneth Arrow and to Robert Aumann, Harry Ballan, Marc DeGirolami, Sheldon 
Evans, Dan Klerman, Sam Levine, Saul Levmore, Anna Roberts, Eva Subotnik, and Eli Wald 
for especially helpful comments and discussion, and to Deans Michael Simons and Anita 
Krishnakumar for financial support.  
1 On the distinction between positive and normative economic analysis of law, see RICHARD 
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §2.2, pp. 31-33 (9th ed. 2014) (defining positive 
economic analysis of law as “the attempt to explain legal rules and outcomes as they are” as 
distinct from the normative effort “to change [legal rules] to make them better.”). 
2 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Ritual and Regulation: A Legal-Economic Interpretation of 
Selected Biblical Texts, 22 J. LEG. STUD. 477 (1993); Geoffrey P. Miller, Contracts of Genesis, 
22 J. LEG. STUD. 15 (1993); Geoffrey P. Miller, J as Constitutionalist: A Political 
Interpretation of Exodus 17:8-16 and Related Texts, 70 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1829 (1995); 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Verbal Feud in the Hebrew Bible: Judges 3:12-30 and 19-21, J. Near 
Eastern Studies (1996); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Song Of Deborah: A Legal-Economic 
Analysis, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2293 (1996); Saul Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law: 
Variety and Uniformity in Ancient and Modern Tort Law, 61 TUL. L. REV. 235 (1986); Saul 
Levmore, Ancient Rights and Wrongs: Rethinking Group Responsibility and Strategic Threats 
in Biblical Texts and Modern Law, 71 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 85 (1995); see also Robert C. 
Ellickson & Charles Dia Thorland, Ancient Land Law: Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel, 71 CHI. 
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Levmore and Geoffrey Miller have argued persuasively that positive 
legal-economic analysis can help to explain the existence, 
preservation, and structure of various biblical regulations.  They argue 
that the Hebrew Bible’s regulations are economically predictable.  But 
they do not try to defend them on normative grounds.3  As Miller has 
explained in a paper narrowly applying positive economic analysis to 
the Talmud, “economic analysis of law is the use of economic 
principles and reasoning to understand legal materials.”4  The narrow 
goal of positive economic analysis of law, applied to Jewish law as to 
other contexts, is thus to understand and explain rather than to justify 
the rules and laws under study.  
This paper builds on prior work applying economics to Jewish 
law.  It argues that Jewish law lends itself not only to positive but also 
to normative legal-economic analysis.  In contrast to prior work 
applying economics to biblical interpretation, this paper employs both 
positive and normative legal-economic analysis.  Three sets of biblical 
regulations—those pertaining to lepers, loan agreements, and land 
ownership—are studied from both positive and normative 
perspectives.  And the conclusion reached in each case is that the 
regulations at issue are not only predictable as a descriptive matter but 
also normatively defensible. 
Section II briefly elaborates on the distinction between positive 
and normative legal-economic analysis.  Section III summarizes some 
of the previous uses of positive legal-economic analysis as a tool of 
biblical exegesis and notes the prior literature’s underuse of normative 
legal-economic analysis as an exegetical device.  Section IV introduces 
and summarizes certain biblical regulations concerning leprosy, debt 
contracts, and land ownership.  Section V applies both positive and 
 
KENT L. REV. 321 (1995); GEOFFREY P. MILLER THE ECONOMICS OF ANCIENT LAW (Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2010). 
3 An important exception from outside the law and economics field concerning not only 
biblical but also rabbinic law is the scholarship of economist Aaron Levine, whose work does 
indeed have a normative dimension.  See AARON LEVINE, ECONOMIC PUBLIC POLICY AND 
JEWISH LAW (1993); AARON LEVINE, ECONOMICS AND JEWISH LAW: HALAKHIC PERSPECTIVES 
(1987); AARON LEVINE, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUDAISM & ECONOMICS (2010) (a 
collection that includes some essays applying economics to Jewish law from a normative 
perspective).  See also Samuel Levine, Richard Posner Meets Reb Chaim of Brisk: A 
Comparative Study in the Founding of Intellectual Legal Movements, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J. 
95 (2006) (considering economics in relation to Jewish law using a comparativist rather than 
a positivist approach); Keith Sharfman, The Law and Economics of Hoarding, 19 LOYOLA 
CONSUMER L. REV. 179 (2016) (normatively assessing the Talmudic ban on hoarding). 
4 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Law & Economics Versus Economic Analysis of Law, 19 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 459, 459 (2011). 
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normative legal-economic analysis to these regulations.  Section VI 
concludes. 
II. POSITIVE VERSUS NORMATIVE ANALYSIS 
Positive legal-economic analysis is concerned with what “is” 
while normative legal-economic analysis is concerned with what 
“ought” to be.5  Elaborating on this distinction will likely be helpful to 
those who are unfamiliar with it. 
Positive legal-economic analysis seeks to explain why 
particular legal rules arise and persist and, somewhat more 
ambitiously, seeks to predict the future form that they might take and 
the behavioral responses that regulatory changes are likely to produce.  
Because positive legal-economic analysis is agnostic as to particular 
social goals, it is sometimes claimed to be the more “scientific” and 
“objective” of the two modes of analysis.6  Conclusions reached via 
positive legal-economic analysis do not, it is said, depend on value-
laden judgments and are therefore less vulnerable to, though certainly 
are not immune from, criticism.7  Positive legal-economic analysis 
does depend critically on one key assumption, namely that people are 
in the main rational maximizers of their satisfactions.8  And so to the 
extent that this assumption is incorrect, the explanations and 
predictions of positive legal-economic analysis are commensurately 
less reliable. 
Normative legal-economic analysis is more ambitious.  It is not 
concerned with merely explaining why legal rules arise and persist, 
predicting the future course that they likely will take, and predicting 
the behavioral responses that changes in them will likely produce.  It 
is concerned, rather, with assessing whether particular legal rules 
enhance or detract from social welfare, that is, with assessing whether 
particular legal rules are, at bottom, desirable or not.9 
 
5 POSNER, supra note 1, at 31-33. On the distinction between “is” and “ought” more 
generally, see Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 
44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1236 (1931).  
6 MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE 
ECONOMICS, 3-43 (1966), at pp. 3-4. 
7 Id. at 4. 
8 POSNER, supra note 1, at 4. 
9 David Colander & Huei-Chun Su, Making Sense of Economists’ Positive-Normative 
Distinction, 2 J. ECON. METHODOLOGY 157 (2015).  
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 “Social welfare” is a slippery concept that is susceptible to 
many definitions.  “Whose welfare?” one might well ask.  That of a 
particular individual (e.g., a buyer, seller, regulator, judge, criminal, 
victim, landowner, etc.), and if so, which?  That of a particular group 
(e.g., buyers or sellers as a group, a family or a tribe, the citizens of a 
particular state or country, etc.), and if so, which?  And anyway, how 
does one measure welfare?  One cannot answer any of these without 
applying values from outside the field of economics.10 
A familiar example of divergence between normative and 
positive economic analysis is the insoluble debate over whether to use 
“Pareto efficiency” or “Kaldor-Hicks efficiency” as the criterion of 
social choice.11  Consider a proposed regulatory change that would 
harm A by $5, help B by $10, and leave all others unaffected.  Would 
the adoption of the proposed change improve economic efficiency?  
The Pareto approach answers “no,” because the change leaves A worse 
off, and thus we cannot say that adoption of the change would produce 
a Pareto improvement.  The Kaldor-Hicks approach, by contrast, says 
“yes” unambiguously—even if it is known that B is very rich and A is 
very poor—because the regulatory change would lead to a net gain in 
aggregate social wealth.  That is, the wealth gain to B of $10 would 
more than offset the $5 loss of wealth to A.  Since in principle B could 
compensate A for its loss and still be better off (by transferring $5 to 
A), the change is better for society (if one’s goal is to maximize social 
wealth) even if in practice A’s loss is not compensated.12 
As this example shows, normative analyses (like the choice 
between the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks criteria) ultimately depend on 
the subjective values of the decisionmaker, which makes normative 
analysis inherently less scientific and objective than its positive analog.  
This inherent indeterminacy of normative analysis should not, 
however, be a reason to avoid it.  In fact, law and economics scholars 
 
10 On the indispensability of values to normative economic analysis, see generally A.C. 
PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920).  
11 On this debate, see POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra, note 1, §1.2, pp. 13-17 
(introducing and summarizing the debate, and defending the Kaldor-Hicks, “wealth 
maximization” criterion).  On the insolubility of this debate, see Louis Kaplow & Steven 
Shavell, Any Non-Individualistic Social Welfare Function Violates the Pareto Principle, 
NBER Working Paper No. W7051 (Mar. 1999); Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian 
Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152 (1970). 
12 POSNER, supra note 1, at 14 (“The Kaldor-Hicks concept is … suggestively called 
potential Pareto superiority: The winners could compensate the losers, whether or not they 
actually do.”). 
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regularly engage in normative analysis in a host of areas,13 and there is 
not any reason to suppose that Jewish law is less amenable to 
normativity than other fields. 
In the area of biblical exegesis, normative economic analysis is 
arguably of special importance, because theological interpretation of 
biblical passages involving social regulation becomes difficult if the 
regulations are not at least normatively defensible.  Normative 
defensibility is necessary (though obviously not sufficient) to justify 
laws and rules.  It is difficult to expect compliance with laws that are 
normatively indefensible.  If a religious law cannot be defended on 
normative grounds, the faithful may come to question the law’s 
authority or even its divine origin.  So there is much at stake in the 
normative evaluation of biblical regulations and Jewish law more 
generally, an exercise to which economic theory can contribute 
significantly. 
III. PRIOR APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMICS TO JEWISH LAW 
Saul Levmore is likely the first law and economics scholar to 
offer a positive legal-economic interpretation of a biblical regulation.14  
In a 1986 article, Levmore suggests a novel thesis: that economics can 
explain the independent development of uniform legal rules across 
time and place.  As evidence supporting this independent uniformity 
hypothesis, Levmore cites the similarity between much of modern tort 
law and the tort laws found in the book of Exodus.  Significantly, the 
focus of Levmore’s article is on whether under economic theory, 
biblical tort law is predictable, not on whether it is normatively 
desirable.  And in the decade following the publication of Levmore’s 
article, several other articles appeared similarly applying a legal-
economic approach to biblical law, including four articles by Geoffrey 
Miller and another by Levmore.15 
 
13 E.g., WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION 
(1974) (applying normative economic analysis to environmental policy); Edward J. 
McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L. J. 283 (1994) 
(applying normative economic analysis to tax policy). See also, Jules Coleman, The Normative 
Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard Posner’s The Economics of Justice, 
34 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (1982) (suggesting that Posner himself engages in normative analysis 
through use of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, which Coleman contends itself embodies normative 
judgments that are not value neutral). 
14 See Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law, supra, note 2. 
15 See citations to Miller and Levmore, supra, note 2. 
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Miller’s approach is similar to Levmore’s.  Each of Miller’s 
articles offers a positive legal-economic interpretation of biblical texts 
and largely eschews normative assessment.  For example, Miller views 
the stories of Adam and Eve in Eden, the fratricide of Cain against 
Abel, and the binding of Isaac on Mount Moriah as texts that bolster 
the institution of and provide a legitimating ideology for the animal 
sacrifice ritual practiced by the priests of ancient Israel.16  Similarly, 
Miller interprets the many and varied contract-like arrangements 
reported in the book of Genesis—e.g., Abraham’s purchase from 
Ephron of the Cave of Machpelah, Esau’s sale of his birthright to 
Jacob, Jacob’s employment agreement with Laban—as a compilation 
of contract doctrines that endured because the tale-like form in which 
they were recorded made them easy to remember, transmit, and 
apply.17  Finally, Miller suggests that the Song of Deborah in the book 
of Judges served “norm-creating” and “norm-enforcing” functions by 
clearly and memorably documenting the rights and obligations of a 
mutual defense pact among the tribes of ancient Israel.18  For each of 
these biblical texts, the issue for Miller is not whether the rule or 
arrangement in the text is normatively desirable but rather simply 
whether the text can be explained by the economic incentives of its 
protagonists, drafters, transcribers, promoters, and readers.  
Inattention to normative defensibility can lead to analysis that 
is substantively incomplete.  For example, in his earlier work on legal-
economic, biblical interpretation, Miller is particularly careful to offer 
his own textual interpretations “without derogation of other 
interpretations”19 and without seeking to undermine “the many-
textured meanings already recognized.”20  However, in his later article 
on the account in Exodus of Amalek’s attack on the Israelites soon after 
they had left Egypt, Miller is less cautious.  Abandoning his 
nonjudgmental attitude to alternative textual interpretations, Miller 
suggests that a theological interpretation of the Amalek story is 
“unconvincing” because “an attack by a threatened group [i.e., 
Amalek] on a large party of hostile trespassers [i.e., the Israelites] 
 
16 Miller, Ritual and Regulation, supra, note 2. 
17 Miller, Contracts of Genesis, supra, note 2. 
18 Miller, The Song of Deborah, supra, note 2. 
19 Miller, Ritual and Regulation, supra, note 2 at 479. 
20 Miller, Contracts of Genesis, supra, note 2 at 19. 
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hardly seems like the kind of degraded moral evil that would justify 
placing the attacker under a ban of eternal enmity.”21 
Miller might also have considered a normative defense of the 
anti-Amalek regulations22 arising out of the Amalek story.  He might 
have suggested that the command to “blot out the remembrance of 
Amalek” is justified on the ground that Amalek inflicted unnecessary 
“civilian” casualties by attacking the weak and feeble Israelites at the 
“rear” (who possibly included women, children, and the elderly).  
Moreover, he might have pointed out how the Amalek regulation 
creates incentives for a king of Israel to shift resources away from 
discretionary, offensive wars against non-antagonist nations in favor 
of (arguably more just) obligatory wars against truly hostile nations.  
Wars against Amalek and certain other antagonists of Israel (as well as 
all defensive wars) are “obligatory” in the sense that the king need not 
obtain permission from the Sanhedrin, the rabbinic high court, to 
initiate them.  Offensive wars against other nations, by contrast, are 
“discretionary” in the sense that the king may not wage them without 
the Sanhedrin’s authorization.23 
Given the relative institutional ease with which a king can 
launch an offensive war against Amalek as compared to launching one 
against a neutral nation, one would expect a king who is otherwise 
indifferent between the two options to choose to fight Amalek rather 
than a neutral nation so as to avoid having to seek the approval of the 
Sanhedrin.  A normative assessment using plausible value assumptions 
would likely view an attack upon Amalek as morally superior to and 
more consistent with Israel’s national interest than an attack on a 
heretofore neutral, nonbelligerent nation.  So the Amalek regulations 
 
21 Miller, J as Constitutionalist, supra, note 2 at 1831. 
22 Deuteronomy 25:17-19: 
Remember what Amalek did unto thee by the way as ye came forth out of 
Egypt; how it met thee by the way, and smote the hindmost of thee, all 
that were enfeebled in thy rear, when thou wast faint and weary; and he 
feared not God.  Therefore it shall be … that though shalt blot out the 
remembrance of Amalek from under heaven; thou shalt not forget. 
Id.  This obligation to blot out Amalek is limited, however, to the circumstance of a refusal to 
surrender. See Maimonides, Mishne Torah, hilchoth melachim 6:1 (the command to blot out 
Amalek was not genocidal because Amalek, like the seven nations of ancient Canaan, had the 
option under Jewish law to surrender without loss of life, as per Deuteronomy 20:10, which 
requires Israel first to offer the enemy a chance to surrender before waging war).  
23 On the distinction between discretionary and obligatory wars and the King’s powers with 
respect to each, see Maimonides, Mishne Torah, hilchoth melachim 5:1-2. See also, David 
Flatto, The King and I: The Separation of Powers in Early Hebraic Political Theory, 20 YALE 
J. L. & HUMANITIES 61 (2008). 
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have the effect of channeling resources away from wars that are less 
likely to be in the national interest to wars that are more likely to be.  
Therefore, properly understood, the Amalek texts are normatively 
defensible when their effect is assessed in light of how things would 
be in their absence. 
Miller’s decision not to consider a normative defense of the 
Amalek story and its accompanying regulations is a prime example of 
the prior literature’s underemphasis of normative analysis.  Normative 
assessment of the Amalek regulations significantly enhances our 
understanding of the Amalek story, and normative analysis of other 
biblical regulations can be similarly useful.  The remaining sections of 
this paper approach three sets of biblical regulations in precisely this 
fashion by engaging in both positive and normative analysis.   
IV. BIBLICAL REGULATION OF LEPROSY, LOANS, AND LAND 
Leprosy.24  Biblical law requires that anyone with the 
symptoms of “leprosy”25 be examined and diagnosed by a priest.26  If 
the diagnosis is positive, the priest must pronounce the individual 
ritually impure and impose a quarantine until such time as the leprosy 
subsides.27  During the quarantine period, hair covering the leper’s 
afflicted areas may not be shaved,28 his clothing must be torn, the hair 
 
24 The regulations described below appear in the book of Leviticus, chs. 13 and 14. 
25 Leviticus refers to a skin ailment called “tzara’ath,” which usually is translated as 
“leprosy” though may in fact mean another disease (e.g., psoriasis or favus).  For convenience, 
I shall refer to the tzara’ath disease as leprosy, as it is conventionally translated.  I also shall 
assume that tzara’ath (however translated) is communicable, which is implicit in the bible’s 
use in relation to tzara’ath of the descriptive term “nega,” i.e., “plague” (see, e.g., Leviticus 
13:2), which connotes communicability. 
26 Leviticus 13:2-3: 
When a man shall have in the skin of his flesh [symptoms suggesting] the 
plague of leprosy, then he shall be brought unto … the priests.  And the 
priest shall look on the plague in the skin of the flesh; and if [certain 
criteria are met] it is the plague of leprosy; and the priest shall look on 
him, and pronounce him unclean. 
Id.  See also Leviticus 13:9-15 (“When the plague of leprosy is in a man, then he shall be 
brought unto the priest.  And the priest shall look, and, behold, if [certain criteria are met] the 
priest shall look on the raw flesh and pronounce him unclean.”).  
27 Leviticus 13:46 (“All the days wherein the plague is in him he shall be unclean; … he 
shall dwell alone; without the camp shall his dwelling be.”). 
28 Leviticus 13:33 (“the scall shall he not shave”).  Relatedly, Deuteronomy 24:8 (“Take 
heed of the plague of leprosy, that thou observe diligently, and do according to all the priests 
the Levites shall teach you, as I commanded them, so shall you do.”) has been interpreted as 
forbidding the leper (or anyone else) to cauterize or  pluck out from the leper’s skin identifying 
8
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on his head may not be cut, and, mantra-like, he must continually 
intone the word “unclean.”29  To end the quarantine, the leper must 
obtain a pronouncement from the priest that the leprosy has healed.30  
Then he must (among other ritual obligations) wash his clothes, shave 
all his hair, bathe in water, and dwell outside of his tent during his first 
seven days upon returning to the camp.31 
The Pentateuch reports only one actual instance of a leprosy 
outbreak during the Israelites’ forty years of wandering in the desert.  
The case reported is that of Miriam, the sister of Moses and Aaron.32  
Miriam gossips about Moses to Aaron, and as punishment, she 
contracts leprosy.  Aaron, the High Priest, examines her, diagnoses the 
ailment, and then forces her to remain outside the camp for seven days 
until the plague subsides.  In contrast to the technical and clinical set 
of leprosy regulations found in Leviticus, the Miriam story recorded in 
Numbers contains an added moral dimension in its suggestion that 
leprosy is a consequence of sin and that the leper’s quarantine is 
therefore morally just and thus is normatively desirable.33    
Loans.  The most significant biblical regulation of loan 
contracts is the prohibition against lending (to an Israelite co-
religionist) at interest34 or helping others to engage in such a lending 
transaction (e.g., by witnessing, drafting, or guaranteeing a loan 
document requiring the payment of interest).35  Other biblical 
 
signs of the leprosy affliction.  See Babylonian Talmud, Shabbath 94b; Maimonides, Mishne 
Torah, hilchoth tum’ath tzara’ath, ch. 10, halacha 1.  
29 Leviticus 13:45 (“And the leper in whom the plague is, his clothes shall be rent, and the 
hair of his head shall go loose, and he shall cover his upper lip, and shall cry: ‘Unclean, 
unclean.’”). The Hebrew term טמא (pronounced “Tah-May”), though rendered by most 
translations to mean “unclean,” in fact is best understood to mean “ritually impure,” a kind of 
spiritual rather than physical uncleanliness. 
30 Leviticus 14:2-3 (“This shall be the law of the leper in the day of his cleansing: he shall 
be brought unto the priest.  And the priest shall go forth out of the camp; and the priest shall 
look, and, behold, if the plague of leprosy be healed in the leper.”). 
31 Leviticus 14:8 (“And he that is to be cleansed shall wash his clothes, and shave off all his 
hair, and bathe himself in water, and he shall be clean; and after that he may come into the 
camp, but shall dwell outside his tent seven days.”) 
32 Numbers 12:1-16. 
33 See Numbers 12:14 (“And the Lord said unto Moses: ‘If her [Miriam’s] father had but 
spit in her face, should she not hide in shame seven days? Let her be shut up without the camp 
seven days’”). 
34 Leviticus 25:36-37; Deuteronomy 23:20. 
35 Exodus 22:24 (“If thou lend money to any of my people, even to the poor with thee, thou 
shalt not be to him as a creditor; neither shall ye lay upon him interest”), which is broadly 
interpreted by the Babylonian Talmud, Bava Mezia 75b, as prohibiting even the facilitation of 
9
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regulations concerning debt transactions include the debtor’s right to 
cancel certain types of debts in each sabbatical year of the 50-year 
jubilee cycle (i.e., every seventh year of the first forty-nine),36 the 
prohibition against secured lending to orphans and widows,37 the 
prohibition against dunning or otherwise demanding repayment from 
a poor or insolvent debtor,38 the prohibition against entering the 
debtor’s home to repossess collateral,39 the prohibition against taking 
in pledge tools of the trade that are needed by the debtor for his 
physical sustenance,40 the obligation not to refrain from lending to the 
poor on account of the imminence of the sabbatical year,41 and the 
obligation to pay workers—whether employees or independent 
contractors—on the same day as their work is performed.42 
It is important to note that the prohibition against lending at 
interest can be circumvented through a device known as a heter iska 
agreement, which in essence partially converts the debt into an equity 
instrument and thereby allows the parties to recharacterize the debtor’s 
 
an interest-bearing loan transaction by participating in the transaction as a guarantor, witness, 
or scribe. 
36 Deuteronomy 15:1-3: 
At the end of every seven years thou shalt make a release.  And this is the 
manner of the release: every creditor shall release that which he hath lent 
unto his neighbour; he shall not exact it of his neighbour and his brother; 
because the Lord’s release hath been proclaimed.  Of a foreigner thou 
mayest exact it; but whatsoever of thine is with thy brother thy hand shal 
release it. 
Id.  
37 Deuteronomy 24:17.  See also, relatedly, Exodus 22:21 (“Ye shall not afflict any widow 
or fatherless child”), which has been interpreted by the Bablyonian Talmud, Shavuoth 45a, as 
requiring a creditor seeking to collect a debt from a widow or orphan to swear an oath (i.e., to 
meet a higher than normal standard of proof).   
38 Exodus 22:24. 
39 Deuternonomy 24:10.  
40 Deuteronomy 24:6 (prohibiting the pledge of millstones—and by implication other 
objects essential to the debtor’s trade—to secure a debt); Deuteronomy 24:12-13 (prohibiting 
a creditor from keeping a debtor’s clothing in pledge for more than a day); Exodus 22:25 
(same; “If thy at all take thy neighbour’s garment to pledge, thou shalt restore it unto him by 
that the sun goeth down”).  The U.S. Bankruptcy Code has some similar limitations. 11 U.S.C. 
§522(d)(3) (exempting some of a bankruptcy debtor’s household goods from collection by 
creditors); 11 U.S.C. §522(d)(6) (exempting certain tools of trade).   
41 Deuteronomy 15:9 (“Beware that there not be a base thought in thy heart, saying: ‘The 
seventh year, the year of release, is at hand’; thine eye be evil against thy needy brother and 
thou give him nought; … it be a sin in thee”).  In this connection, note also the general biblical 
obligation to be charitable—and to lend— to the poor.  Deuteronomy 15:8; Exodus 22:24. 
42 Leviticus 19:13; Deuteronomy 24:15. 
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interest payments as a return on the creditor’s equity.43  A modern 
alternative to the heter iska that can accomplish the same thing is a 
sale-leaseback arrangement, whereby an asset (e.g., a piece of land) is 
sold by the would-be debtor to the would-be creditor and then is leased 
back from the creditor.  The lease payments can be structured in such 
a way so as to make them economically indistinguishable from loan 
payments with interest.  Yet the lease payments would not as a legal 
matter be characterized as interest for purposes of Jewish law.44 
 The debtor’s right to a debt discharge in the sabbatical year 
can similarly be contracted around.  One way of doing so is for the 
parties to contract for a term structure explicitly contemplating 
repayment beyond the sabbatical year.45  For example, if a loan is made 
in the fourth year of the sabbatical cycle and the lending agreement 
contemplates from the outset that the loan will not come due for ten 
years, then the sabbatical year reached three years after the loan is 
made will not discharge the debt.  Debt is discharged in the sabbatical 
year only once it becomes due, but not if it does not become due until 
after the sabbatical year. Alternatively, the parties can anticipate that 
if the debt becomes due and remains unpaid in the seventh year, its 
cancellation can be avoided through the device of pruzbul, a legal 
mechanism that permits the creditor to transfer the debt to the 
rabbinical court during the sabbatical year and thereby avoid 
discharge, on the theory that only those debts that are “with your 
brother [i.e., the creditor]” (Deuteronomy 15:3) are canceled, but not 
those that are with the court.46 
Land.  Two of the Hebrew Bible’s most significant regulations 
affecting the ownership of land are (1) that ancestral lands revert back 
to their original owners at the jubilee year (i.e., every fiftieth year)47 
 
43 On heter iska, see J. David Bleich, Hetter Iska, the Permissible Venture: A Device to 
Avoid the Prohibition Against Interest Bearing Loans, in AARON LEVINE, THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF JUDAISM AND ECONOMICS, supra note 3, pp. 197-22. 
44 Id.; see also Daniel Z. Feldman, The Jewish Prohibition of Interest: Themes, Scopes, and 
Contemporary Applications, in LEVINE, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUDAISM AND 
ECONOMICS, supra note 3, pp. 239-254. 
45 Babylonian Talmud, Makkoth 3b. 
46 On avoiding debt discharge in the sabbatical year and the institution of pruzbul, see id. at 
tosafoth, s.v. ha-moser; see also Mishna, Sh’vi’ith 10:3-4).  
47 Leviticus 25:10, 13: 
And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim liberty throughout the 
land unto all the inhabitants thereof; it shall be a jubilee unto you; and ye 
shall return every man unto his possession, and ye shall return every man 
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and thus cannot be sold in perpetuity but rather must in effect be leased 
for a fixed term;48 and (2) landowners are prohibited from cultivating 
their land during sabbatical years (i.e., every seventh year) but must 
rather allow the land to lie fallow.49  Other relevant regulations include 
the right of sellers of ancestral land and their kin to “redeem” the land 
(i.e., exercise an option to buy back the land prior to its automatic 
reversion in the jubilee year)50 and the right of the initial seller of a 
dwelling in a walled city to sell the dwelling in perpetuity, with the 
option to “redeem” the dwelling (i.e., to buy it back), exercisable 
within one year of the initial sale date.51 
As with the prohibition against interest and the discharge of 
debts in the seventh year, the prohibition against selling ancestral land 
in perpetuity can largely be contracted around.  While an explicitly 
perpetual sale is not legally feasible, land can be sold for any finite 
term, including for a term that will conclude beyond the next jubilee 
year (or even beyond multiple jubilee years).  So the parties could 
stipulate to a sale for a term of, say, 60 years—or for that matter 600 
years.  So long as the sale is for a fixed, non-perpetual term that 
explicitly extends beyond the jubilee year, there is no reversion in the 
jubilee year.52    
V. APPLICATION OF POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE LEGAL-
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS TO BIBLICAL REGULATIONS 
RELATING TO LEPROSY, LOANS, AND LAND 
What accounts for these regulations with respect to leprosy, 
loans, and land, and are these regulations normatively defensible?  
Economic analysis can help to answer these questions. 
 
unto his family. . . . In this year of jubilee ye shall return every man unto 
his possession. 
Id.  
48 Leviticus 25:23 (“And the land shall not be sold in perpetuity, for the land is Mine; for ye 
are strangers and settlers with me”). 
49 Leviticus 25:3-4 (“Six years thou shalt sow thy field … .  But in the seventh year shall be 
a sabbath of solemn rest ro the land, a sabbath unto the Lord; though shalt neither sow thy 
field nor prune they vineyard”); Exodus 23:10-11 (“And six years thou shalt sow thy land . . . 
.  But the seventh year thou shalt let it rest and lie fallow, that the poor of thy people may eat; 
and what they leave the beast of the field shall eat”). 
50 Leviticus 25:25-28. 
51 Leviticus 25:29-30. 
52 Babylonian Talmud, Bava Mezia 79a (interpeting Leviticus 25:23 (“And the land shall 
not be sold in perpetuity”)). 
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Leprosy.  An economic interpretation of the leprosy regulations 
codified in Leviticus and implemented in the case of Miriam’s 
affliction as recounted in the book of Numbers might run as follows.  
Positive economic theory suggests that a society the majority of whose 
members are not as yet infected but fear becoming infected by a 
communicable disease is likely to evolve a regulatory regime that 
would result in the early detection and containment of that disease.  
That the society’s norms will likely reflect the preferences of the 
unafflicted majority is implied by the theory of “public choice” and by 
economic models of the private demand for public regulation.53  And 
past experience with the social stigmatization of those diagnosed with 
the AIDS virus (and more recently with those who early on tested 
positive for Covid-19) offers empirical support for the theory.54 
Positive economic theory thus expects and predicts that non-
leprous Israelites—and perhaps all Israelites from an ex ante 
perspective—would generally favor a public health regime whose goal 
is detection and containment, in which those afflicted with leprosy 
would be separated from society until such time as the affliction 
subsides.  And that is indeed the regulatory regime that the Hebrew 
Bible institutes.  A reliable and (one hopes) incorruptible specialist—
the priest—is charged with diagnosing the disease and thereafter, 
imposing and administering a quarantine.  The further requirements 
that the leper’s appearance (torn clothing, uncut hair) and speech 
(“unclean, unclean”) be regulated in such a way as to make his 
affliction easily apparent to passersby similarly promotes the goal of 
containment.  From the outward manifestations of the leper’s disease, 
passersby will know to steer clear.  And lepers seeking to evade the 
quarantine will have a difficult time, given their appearance, 
concealing their leper status. 
As a textual matter, note that the rules concerning the leper are 
written in the passive voice (e.g., “he shall be brought unto the priest”), 
suggesting that third parties with an interest in containing the disease 
 
53 On the economic theory of public choice, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, 
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).  For an economic model on the 
demand for regulation, see George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. 
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).  For extensions to the Stigler model, see Sam Peltzman, Toward 
a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 211 (1976); Gary S. Becker, A 
Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 
(1983). 
54 See TOMAS J. PHILIPSON AND RICHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH: THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1993). 
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will see to it that the leper is diagnosed and quarantined.  This is 
predictable, given that lepers have little incentive to quarantine 
themselves.  Also, note the further precautions before the leper can 
reenter society: hair must be shaved, clothing washed, flesh bathed, 
and upon readmission, there must be an additional seven days spent 
outside the tent.  These regulations, too, seem calculated to contain the 
disease.   
While the regulations in Leviticus seems relatively 
straightforward and can be explained descriptively as a public health 
initiative, the passage in Numbers recounting Miriam’s contraction of 
the disease is not so easily explained.  What purpose is served by the 
exclusive recordation of the Miriam story?  Surely there must have 
been others besides Miriam who became afflicted with leprosy during 
the Israelites’ forty years in the desert.  For if Miriam’s situation was 
unique, why create such an elaborate set of rules just for her?  On this 
question, Miller’s positive analysis of Esau’s sale of his birthright for 
a mess of porridge is instructive.55  Miller observes that in a world 
where recording, learning, and obtaining compliance with legal rules 
is costly, one would expect to observe the recordation of only the most 
difficult and memorable cases from which easier cases may be inferred 
a fortiori.  If the leprosy regulations (harsh as they are) are enforceable 
against a person of Miriam’s prominence, then surely they must be 
stringently enforced against everyone.  Surely no exceptions of any 
kind can be made, no matter how privileged or highly-placed the leper 
might be.  The advantage, then, of recording Miriam’s case exclusively 
is that knowledge of the “holding” there makes the rule in other leprosy 
cases easy to infer.56  
 
55 Miller, Contracts of Genesis, supra, note 2 at 26: 
Why would the hard case be transmitted in oral tradition and the easy cases 
not?  Because the hard case conveys information in the most economical 
fashion.  Given the Jacob-Esau story, other fact patterns that might arise 
seem a fortiori.  In an oral tradition where economy of meaning is at a 
premium because of the costs of memorization, it is exactly the hard case 
that we would expect to see passed through the culture.  The easy cases 
will be forgotten for the same reason that we forget the easy cases today: 
they simply do not convey as much information. 
Id.  
56 Another instance of the phenomenon that Miller identifies is the story of the daughters of 
Zelophehad as recounted in Numbers 27:1-11.  They successfully litigated against their tribe 
before Moses the question whether title to ancestral land in Israel could pass to a man’s 
daughters in the absence of any male heirs, or whether instead the land would revert back to 
the tribe.  Id. at 27:8 (“If a man die, and have no son, then ye shall cause the inheritance to 
pass unto his daughter.”).  Surely there must have been other property (as well as other types 
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As a normative matter, it is worth noting that the biblical 
regime, while certainly a plausible approach to the problem of leprosy, 
is hardly inevitable.  There are other ways to curb the spread of disease, 
such as through tort or criminal liability.  But both of these alternative 
solutions would produce suboptimal levels of deterrence.  Tort liability  
would not deter lepers with low levels of wealth, and criminal liability 
could not be imposed in cases where harm is inflicted only negligently 
but not intentionally. So a regulatory solution like quarantine is thus 
quite plausibly the very best way to deal with epidemiological 
problems like leprosy, and therefore the biblical regulation appears to 
satisfy a standard of normative defensibility. 
Loans.  There is already an economic literature that offers both 
a positive explanation for the ubiquity of “usury laws” and a normative 
assessment of them.57  Glaeser and Scheinkman suggest that 
restrictions on charging interest might be explained, as a positive 
matter, by borrowers having disproportionate political clout as 
compared to that of lenders (e.g., situations where there is a large 
institutional borrower  that might benefit from, and hence lobby for, 
regulations leading to lower interest charges on loans).  They also 
suggest that usury laws can be justified on normative grounds as a form 
of “social insurance” that smooths consumption over time by 
facilitating an arrangement whereby behavioral agents lend in 
relatively high wealth, low marginal utility of income periods and 
borrow in relatively low wealth, high marginal utility periods of 
income. 
But Glaeser and Scheinkman do not seek to explain (indeed, it 
seems they are unaware of) the fact that, under Jewish law, the usury 
laws on the books can be contracted around (and often are), as 
explained above.58  Recognizing that the Bible’s restrictive laws with 
respect to debt transactions can be contracted around leads inevitably 
 
of) litigation before Moses.  Indeed, we know that therre must have been from the story of 
Jethro, who upon observing that his son-in-law Moses “sat to judge the people … from the 
morning unto the evening” (Exodus 18:13), devised a justice system whereby lower judges 
would judge the people in garden variety cases, with Moses judging them only in the “hard 
cases” (Exodus 18:26).  So even though there were other cases, the case of Daughters of 
Zelophehad v. Tribe (like the cases of Esau v. Jacob and In re Miriam) is exclusively reported 
because it is an economizing “hard” case from which easier rules can be inferred.  
57 See Edward L. Glaeser & Jose Scheinkman, Neither A Borrower Nor A Lender Be: An 
Economic Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws, 41 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1998); 
GIUSEPPE COCO, CREDIT RATIONING AND THE WELFARE GAIN FROM USURY LAWS, UNIVERSITY 
OF EXETER DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER (October 1997). 
58 See supra notes 45 & 46 along with their accompanying text. 
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to the conclusion that the institutional lobbying and consumption 
smoothing stories offered by Glaeser and Scheinkman are inapposite 
in the Jewish law context, where the regulations cover small consumer 
loans in an  economically stable, agrarian society.  So our task is to 
replace their model with contextually more relevant explanations. 
The logical place to begin is to ask whether there is any 
practical consequence to these lending regulations if they can be 
circumvented by contract.  Economic analysis suggests that there is 
indeed a consequence.  The Bible’s regulations forbidding interest and 
requiring release in the sabbatical year will, even with the possibility 
of contracting around them, continue to have some bite with respect to 
“small loan”/ “low stakes” debt transactions.  This is because there are 
“transaction costs” associated with contracting around the regulations, 
and this cost will not be worth incurring in low stakes transactions.59 
One, therefore, should expect the biblical regulations 
concerning debt contracts to have two effects on  low-principal 
borrowers: (1) to reduce the borrowing costs faced by small loan 
borrowers who are fortunate enough to obtain financing; and (2) to 
reduce the supply of loan funds available for such low stakes 
borrowers.  Because these effects are offsetting from the perspective 
of borrowers, it is difficult to say whether, overall, low stakes 
borrowers are helped or harmed by the Bible’s lending restrictions.  
But one can say unambiguously that low-principal lenders are harmed 
overall.  Still, perhaps the harm to them is more than offset by possible 
gains to -low-principal borrowers.  So long as this redistribution effect 
is a real possibility, the identified effects of the regulations are 
normatively defensible.  Moreover, to the extent that transaction costs 
are high enough to make “contracting around” unrealistic in most 
cases, the Glaeser & Scheinkman analysis applies—and then looking 
at low stakes debt contracts in isolation, the regulations might well be 
normatively justified   
But these lending regulations have an additional consequence 
in the larger loan context.  Aside from the transaction costs that must 
be incurred to contract around the background rules, there also would 
likely be information effects as a consequence of the parties’ efforts to 
contract around the background rules that would otherwise apply.  
Prospective borrowers who show reluctance to facilitate the waiver of 
 
59 On the economic analysis and significance of transaction costs, see POSNER, supra note 
1, at 50-55; see generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 
(1960). 
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their sabbatical year, debt discharge rights signal to their prospective 
lenders that they believe there is a significant risk of loan default.  
Similarly, a prospective borrower who is uninformed of the 
background default rules governing debt transactions (specifically, the 
default rule requiring the release of the debt in the sabbatical year) 
would of necessity become informed about the rule upon efforts by the 
prospective lender to contract around it. 
The first of these information effects—i.e., signaling60 by 
borrowers about the likelihood of default—unambiguously helps 
lenders who learn valuable information from the contracting around 
process that they could not learn without the presence of the sabbatical 
release rule at the outset as the default regulatory mechanism.  Perhaps 
the value of this information effect more than offsets the lenders’ 
increased transaction costs.  On the other hand, this information effect 
helps only some borrowers (i.e., those with low default risk) while 
hurting others (i.e., those with high default risk).  On balance, then, 
because it enables lenders to tailor their loans more efficiently for each 
borrower, the first information effect is likely welfare-enhancing (from 
a Kaldor-Hicks perspective), assuming that transaction costs are 
sufficiently low. 
The net consequences of the second information effect—i.e., 
the education of otherwise unsophisticated borrowers about the 
background legal regime that governs lending contracts—are unclear, 
but plausibly are also welfare enhancing.  The effect unambiguously 
hurts lenders by (a) raising  transaction costs; (b) improving the 
bargaining position of borrowers who would otherwise not think to 
negotiate for such terms; and (c) not in any way helping the lenders 
with respect to sophisticated borrowers.  Sophisticated borrowers are 
unaffected by disclosure of information that they already know, though 
presumably, they would have higher transaction costs due to lenders’ 
efforts to contract around the background rule.  However, 
unsophisticated borrowers benefit from the educative function of the 
default rule, perhaps by an amount sufficient to offset their own 
increased transaction costs as well as the increased costs imposed on 
the lenders and on other borrowers. 
 
60 On the economics of signalling in markets with incomplete or imperfect information, see  
ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18-21 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, Signalling or 
Reciprocity? A Response to Eric Posner’s LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS , 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367 
(2002).  
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Overall, the welfare effects of imposing a contractually 
waivable restriction on interest and a contractually waivable right to 
cancel debts in the sabbatical year are difficult to assess.  But under at 
least one plausible set of assumptions, the net welfare effects are 
positive. 
Land.  What we have asked about the land regulations we can 
also ask about the loan regulations.  If the restriction on perpetual sales 
is effectively waivable by contract, then what effect if any does the 
jubilee regulation really have?  Again, the answer is somewhat 
ambiguous as an empirical matter.  On the one hand, the regulations 
undoubtedly increases transaction costs, in the sense that parties to 
land sales have to specify a term of years short of a fee simple sale in 
perpetuity, whereas without the regulation they would not.  This 
limitation in itself should reduce the volume of land sales.  Moreover, 
the the land sale regulation text in the book of Leviticus may well have 
“preference shaping” effects on tribe members (similar to those that 
Miller suggests are caused by the Song of Deborah61) which would 
also tend to depress land sales by raising the price that a tribesman 
would charge a non-tribesman and reducing the price that a non-
tribesman would offer to pay.  Since there may actually be positive 
externalities62 associated with living in close proximity to other 
members of one’s tribe—and because such externalities would be 
magnified to the extent that inter-tribal land sales are reduced—a 
reduction in land sales could in theory increase welfare.  While this is 
plausible under only a restrictive set of assumptions, it nevertheless 
satisfies a normative defensibility standard. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper continues the work of law and economics scholars 
to employ legal-economic analysis as a tool of biblical interpretation 
and explication.  The principal argument suggested in the paper is that 
previous economic interpretations of biblical texts might well have 
been improved if normative as well as positive analyses had been 
undertaken.  An effort to demonstrate the benefits of such a normative 
 
61 Geoffrey P. Miller, The Song Of Deborah: A Legal-Economic Analysis, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2293 (1996), supra note 2. 
62 On economic externalities associated with population characteristics, see Posner, supra 
note 1, at 179-181; Shai Bernstein & Eyal Winter, Contracting with Heterogeneous 
Externalities, 4 AM. ECON. J. 50 (2012). 
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enterprise was attempted here.  Three sets of biblical regulations—
those pertaining to leprosy, loans, and land ownership—were 
normatively assessed, and all were found, under certain assumptions, 
to be normatively defensible. 
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